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Aaron’s Law: Reactionary Legislation in 
the Guise of Justice 
Matthew Aaron Viana 
10 U. MASS. L. REV. 214 
ABSTRACT 
This Note argues that the proposed amendment to the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act dubbed “Aaron’s Law,” created in the wake of the prosecution and subsequent 
suicide of hacktivist Aaron Swartz, should not be enacted as it is overly reactionary 
legislation which would have unfortunate and unjust repercussions in the realm of 
civil litigation. This Note first describes the circumstances under which Mr. Swartz 
found himself prosecuted under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, namely his 
intrusion into, and downloading massive amounts of data from, large internet 
databases like PACER and JSTOR. This Note also explores the disputed 
interpretation of the CFAA phrase “exceeds authorized access” by the Circuit Courts 
of Appeal and according to the maxims of statutory interpretation, the particular 
phrase which Aaron’s Law seeks to amend. Then this Note examines Robbins v. 
Lower Merion School District, a case utilizing the existing language of the CFAA.  
Amending the language as proposed by Aaron’s Law would potentially remove a 
civil remedy in Robbins. This Note concludes that prosecutorial discretion should be 
used in cases like Aaron Swartz’s, so as to allow the CFAA to function as intended 
by Congress and to provide the Robbins plaintiffs, and similarly situated individuals, 
a meaningful remedy. 
AUTHOR NOTE 
Matthew Aaron Viana expects to receive his J.D. in May, 2015 from the University 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
he federal indictment and subsequent suicide of computer 
programmer and hacktivist
1
Aaron Swartz sparked tremendous 
controversy surrounding the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(“CFAA”)2. Aaron Swartz was charged with eleven counts of violating 
the CFAA for allegedly downloading and distributing a substantial 
portion of JSTOR’s digitized academic journal archive.3 The CFAA 
criminalizes, among other things, activities which stem from 
“knowingly access[ing] a computer without authorization or 
exceed[ing] authorized access.”4 This is, arguably, broad language that 
could encompass a wide range of computer activities. An 
implementation based on its broad language makes this provision of 
the CFAA unfortunately vulnerable to possible injustice. Aaron was a 
victim of such injustice. However, the broad language of the CFAA 
has its merits and should not be amended by way of reactionary 
legislation crafted in the guise of justice. 
The statutory language, “knowingly accesses a computer without 
authorization or exceeds authorized access,” itself, has been subject to 
varying interpretations.
5
 There is a Circuit split regarding the meaning 
of both phrases: “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized 
access” under the CFAA. The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits 
have each held that the CFAA broadly covers violations of corporate 
computer use restrictions.
6
 In contrast, the Ninth and Fourth Circuits 
have narrowly interpreted “exceeds authorized access” so as not to 
                                                 
1
 “Hacktivist” is a portmanteau of the words “hacker” and “activist,” employed to 
describe an individual who uses hacking skills to further activist goals. 
2
 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2014) (The CFAA is a statute that provides 
civil and criminal penalties and targets the practices of computer hacking and 
misappropriation of information.). 
3
 Superseding Indictment, United States v. Swartz, No. 11-CR-10260-NMG (D. 
Mass. 2012). Available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2012
/09/swartzsuperseding.pdf. 
4
 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(2) (2014). 
5
 See, supra, Part III. 
6
 See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010) (Social Security 
employee convicted for using computer access to access records for personal 
reasons); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 854 (5th Cir. 2010) (bank employee 
convicted for use of computer access to transmit account numbers to 
accomplice); and Int’l Airport Ctrs. LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(employee convicted for using corporate files on company laptop for purposes 
of setting up a competing business). 
T 
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include mere violations of corporate computer restrictions.
7
 Depending 
on the jurisdiction, it is arguable regarding whether the statute allows a 
computer user to be federally indicted for minor crimes such as 
breaching a terms of service agreement.
8
 
Aaron’s Law, proposed on June 20, 2013, would amend the 
CFAA, eliminating the “exceeds authorized access” provision.9 It 
would further define “access without authorization” to include only 
obtaining “information on a protected computer,” that the “accesser 
lacks authorization to obtain,” by “knowingly circumventing one or 
more technological or physical measures that are designed to exclude 
or prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining or altering that 
information.”10 Therefore, Aaron’s law would decriminalize violations 
of an agreement, policy, duty, or contractual obligation regarding 
computer use, such as a terms of service agreement. 
Aaron’s Law, if enacted, would be a prime example of reactionary 
legislation providing a disservice to harmed individuals in the civil 
arena. It would eviscerate an essential provision contained in the 
CFAA, reversing legislative history, raising policy concerns, and, as 
this note emphasizes, leave harmed plaintiffs with one less avenue for 
recovery. Keeping in mind the dual nature of the CFAA, having both 
civil and criminal components, if Aaron’s law was to be enacted and 
the CFAA deprived of the full force of its current wording, the effects 
would be felt in both arenas. While hackstivists such as Aaron may 
have benefitted from the different standard of the proposed 
amendment, the repercussions felt by victims in the civil arena would 
be unfortunate and unjustified. 
This Note proposes that Aaron’s Law should not be enacted 
because the impact of such reactionary legislation, prompted by 
prosecutorial indiscretion, exacts too high a toll on victims in the civil 
                                                 
7
 See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (employees 
transmitting corporate information to ex-employee did not exceed authorized 
access as the employees had full access to the information); WEC Carolina 
Energy Solutions, LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012) (former 
employee downloading and using corporate information for benefit of 
competitor is not exceeding authorized access for purposes of CFAA). 
8
 Terms of service agreements, or terms and conditions agreements, are 
ubiquitous and usually encountered when creating online accounts, from email 
to LinkedIn accounts. They usually are accompanied by a checkbox with the 
text “I agree.” 
9
 Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R. 2454, 113th Cong. (2013). 
10
 Id. 
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arena who are seeking relief under a statute uniquely suited to ever-
evolving computer technology. The language of the CFAA, as it 
currently exists, is well suited to be used as necessitated by pervasive, 
potentially damaging and evolving security vulnerabilities. 
Prosecutorial overreach as regrettable as it is, should not result in a 
limiting effect upon victims in the civil arena who have been harmed 
and should be entitled to specific and varied avenues of recovery. Part 
II of this Note provides a background of Aaron Swartz’s rise as a 
prominent hacktivist and the unfortunate results of his indictment. Part 
III discusses the current Circuit split as well as cases interpreting the 
CFAA. Part IV discusses the case of Robbins v. Lower Merion School 
District, which demonstrates a circumstance to which the CFAA’s 
broad language is well suited.
11
 It is in light of the CFAA’s legislative 
history, its interpretation by the Circuit Courts of Appeal and its real 
life impact in society as illustrated by Aaron’s story, that this Note 
questions the soundness of legislation proposed under the guise of 
preventing the type of injustice that occurred in the case against Aaron. 
II. AARON SWARTZ AND HIS LEGACY 
A. Aaron Hillel Swartz 
According to his obituary, Aaron Swartz was a programmer and 
“open-data crusader.”12 By the age of fourteen he had helped develop 
RSS software, which enables syndication of information on the 
internet.
13
 The following year, he wrote code for Creative Commons, 
which promotes alternatives to standard copyright licenses.
14
 At 
nineteen years of age, Aaron was a developer of the social networking 
news website Reddit, which is perhaps his best known, and certainly 
most utilized, project.
15
 However, it was his conduct regarding his title 
as an “open-data crusader,” that earned him the name recognition 
attributed to him today. 
                                                 
11
 Complaint, Robbins v. Lower Marion School Dist., 2010 WL 581739 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 16, 2010) No. 10CV00665 (hereinafter “Robbins Complaint”). 
12
 See Jack Schofield, Obituary of Aaron Swartz, THE GUARDIAN, (Jan. 13 2013, 
2:22 P.M.), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jan/13/aaron-swartz. 
13
 See Larissa MacFarquhar, Requiem For a Dream, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 11, 
2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/03/11/130311fa_fact_macfarquhar. 
14
 See id. 
15
 See id. 
2014 Aaron's Law 219 
After his success developing Reddit, Aaron became a political 
activist, focusing on open access to academic information. He penned 
the well-known—in the open-access world— Guerilla Open Access 
Manifesto in July, 2008.
16
 Later in his life, Aaron went on to fight 
against anti-piracy legislation in furtherance of his position regarding 
open-access to data on the internet.
17
 By this time in his career as an 
activist, Aaron had already, allegedly, taken actions that placed him at 
serious odds with federal anti-hacking law. 
B. PACER & RECAP 
To better understand Aaron’s motives and to better appreciate the 
negative ramifications of enacting Aaron’s Law, it is important to 
briefly discuss Aaron’s work advancing open access before the 
“MIT/JSTOR Incident”18 that ultimately led to Aaron’s federal 
indictment and subsequent suicide. In 2008, Aaron began work on a 
project that bears resemblance to the actions he took with JSTOR’s 
database.
19
 At the time, however, public court records were Aaron’s 
target, as opposed to academic documents.
20
 The court records Aaron 
sought to liberate are digitally stored by the Public Access to Court 
Electronic Records system, or PACER, which is an electronic public 
access web service that provides users with case and docket 
information from Federal Appellate, District and Bankruptcy courts.
21
 
On top of regular fees, PACER charges $0.10 per page retrieved.
22
 
                                                 
16
 Aaron Swartz, Guerilla Open Access Manifesto, (Jul. 2008), 
http://ia600808.us.archive.org/17/items/GuerillaOpenAccessManifesto/Goamjul
y2008.pdf. 
17
 Daniel Wagner and Verena Dobnik, Swartz’ Death Fuels Debate Over 
Computer Crime, The Associated Press (Jan. 13, 2013, 8:25 P.M.), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/swartz-death-fuels-debate-over-computer-crime. 
18
 The MIT/JSTOR Incident refers to allegations that, in 2011, Aaron Swartz 
illegally accessed JSTOR archives at Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT). JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals. See New to JSTOR? 
Learn more about us, JSTOR.ORG, http://about.jstor.org/10things (describing 
JSTOR’s mission and designed functions). For additional discussion of the 
MIT/JSTORR Incident, see infra Section IIC. 
19
 Sam Klein, Aaron Swartz vs. United States, THE LONGEST NOW (Jul. 24, 2011, 
11:04 P.M.) http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/sj/2011/07/24/aaron-swartz-v-united-
states/. 
20
 See id. 
21
  Frequently Asked Questions, PACER.GOV, http://www.pacer.gov/psc/hfaq.html 
(last visited Sep. 20, 2014). 
22
 See id. 
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According to PACER, the case information made available to its users 
is a matter of public record and, as such, can be reproduced without 
permission.
23
 
There are some open-access advocates who deride the fact that 
access to the court documents is subject to an out-of-date fee-based 
service.
24
 PACER was, after all, originally designed to provide 
electronic access to court records in 1988.
25
 . In 2007, four years after 
the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) first requested non-fee 
access to PACER, the Judicial Conference approved and instituted a 
one-year pilot to assess the effects of free public access to PACER 
documents.
26
 The pilot program provided free public access to Federal 
court records at seventeen depository libraries.
27
 Although slated to 
run for up to twenty-four months, the pilot would abruptly end just 
eleven months after its inception.
28
 Even a Senator, Joe Lieberman of 
Connecticut, wrote to the judiciary inquiring as to whether PACER’s 
fee structure complies with the legislation that funds the service.
29
 
According to Senator Lieberman, the fees collected by PACER are 
higher than the cost of dissemination.
30
 This has resulted in a surplus 
of funds coming into the Judiciary Information Technology Fund as a 
result of fees being charged for obtaining public information.
31
 
Enter Carl Malamud, an open-government advocate who is the 
President and Founder of Public.Resource.Org, a website which aims 
                                                 
23
 See id. 
24
 See John Schwartz, An Effort to Upgrade a Court Archive System to Free and 
Easy, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02
/13/us/13records.html?_r=0 (Malamud stating “The system is 15 to 20 years out 
of date.”). 
25
 See id. (discussing the origins of PACER); see also Timothy B. Lee, The inside 
story of Aaron Swartz’s campaign to liberate court fillings, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 
8, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/02/the-inside-story-of-aaron-
swartzs-campaign-to-liberate-court-filings/. 
26
 Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER), FDLP.GOV (Oct. 25, 
2012), http://www.fdlp.gov/23-about/projects/140-pacer (last updated July 23, 
2104). 
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. 
29
 Joseph Lieberman, Letter to the Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal (Feb. 27, 2009), 
https://public.resource.org/scribd/13252410.pdf. 
30
 See id. 
31
 See id. 
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to make “government information more available.”32 Malamud 
encouraged fellow activists to go to the pilot libraries, where PACER 
access was free to the public, download as many documents as 
possible, and send them to him for publication on the internet.
33
 Aaron 
answered Malamud’s call to arms. Aaron recruited a friend to visit one 
of the pilot libraries where he extracted an authentication cookie
34
 set 
by PACER’s site.35 This authentication cookie was not tied to any 
specific IP address.
36
 Thus, the authentication cookie could be used by 
any computer on the internet to access the PACER service for free as 
if it were located in a pilot library.
3738
 
On September 29, 2009, it came to the attention of court 
administrators that the pilot library in Sacramento, while receiving the 
free service, would have accumulated a $1.5 million PACER bill.
39
 By 
the time the hack was discovered and the pilot program was 
suspended, Aaron had downloaded 2.7 million documents from 
PACER.
40
 Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 
Department of Justice investigated Aaron’s actions but filed no 
charges.
41
 Today, those looking to obtain court documents from 
PACER without paying fees may do so by downloading a Firefox 
extension, known as RECAP, which searches for free copies of 
                                                 
32
 PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG-A501(C)(3) NONPROFIT CORPORATION, https://public
.resource.org/index.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2014). 
33
 Schwartz, supra note 24. 
34
 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 274 (11th ed. 2004) ([a cookie 
is] a small file or part of a file stored on a World Wide Web user’s computer, 
created and subsequently read by a Web site server, and containing personal 
information (as a user identification code, customized preferences, or a record of 
pages visited)). 
 
35
 Lee, supra note 25. 
36
 See id. 
37
 Malamud did not support Swartz’s use of an authentication cookie. An email to 
Swartz from Malamud reads “[T]his is not how we do things. . .[W]e don’t cut 
corners, we belly up to the bar and get permission.” Malamud told Swartz that if 
they were going to access PACER documents from sites other than the pilot 
libraries, then they would need a valid account and should pay the PACER fees, 
available at https://public.resource.org/aaron/pub/msg00197.html. 
38
 See id. 
39
 See id. 
40
 See id. 
41
 See id. 
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documents already uploaded by other users.
42
 In its development 
RECAP was pre-loaded with the documents Swartz obtained from the 
PACER service.
43
 Aaron’s work with PACER was, indeed, an 
important first step toward breaking down the “paywall” that hinders 
full public access to court documents online. 
C. The MIT/JSTOR Incident and the CFAA Violation 
On January 6, 2011, Aaron allegedly broke into an MIT building 
where he infiltrated a closet containing computer networking 
equipment.
44
 The networking equipment in this closet could provide 
access to MIT’s computer network, as well as access to JSTOR 
archives, to those who are savvy enough to perform the functions 
necessary to access that information.
45
 JSTOR is a not-for-profit 
digital library designed to help university and college libraries.
46
 The 
subsequent prosecution alleged that Aaron broke into this closet in 
order to access and download a substantial portion of JSTOR’s archive 
of digitized academic journal articles.
47
 An estimated four million 
academic articles were downloaded from subscription-based JSTOR as 
a result of the network breach.
48
 
A federal indictment was filed on September 12, 2012 alleging that 
Aaron contrived to, among other things, violate the CFAA.
49
 The 
CFAA prohibits unauthorized access to any “protected computer,” 
which is defined as any computer “in or affecting interstate commerce 
or communication.”50 Although the CFAA punishes seven activities, 
                                                 
42
 Bobbie Johnson, Recap: cracking open US courtrooms, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 
11, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/nov/11/recap-us-
courtrooms. 
43
  Lee, supra note 25. 
44
 See Application for Criminal Complaint (Jan. 7, 2011), http://mitcrimeclub.org
/SwartzFilings-state.pdf. 
45
 See id. 
46
 New to JSTOR? Learn more about us (Sep. 20, 2014), http://about.jstor.org
/10things (describing JSTOR’s mission and designed functions). 
47
  Application for Criminal Complaint, supra note 44. 
48
 See Alleged Hacker Charged With Stealing Over Four Million Documents From 
MIT Network, US ATT’Y’S OFFICE DISTRICT OF MASS (Jul. 19, 2011), available 
at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2011/07/Swartz-Aaron-
PR.pdf . 
49
 See Superseding Indictment, United States v. Swartz, supra note 3. 
50
 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012); Id. § 1030(e)(2)(B). 
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its most important criminal provision is Section (a)(2)(C).
51
 This 
section provides that any person who “intentionally accesses a 
computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and 
thereby obtains information from any protected computer” violates the 
CFAA.
52
 However, the CFAA does not define “exceeds authorized 
access,” providing no guidance to distinguish between authorized and 
unauthorized forms of computer use. 
Consequently, Aaron’s actions constituted unauthorized access in 
violation of the CFAA. This indictment exposed Aaron to an 
extraordinary and disproportionate level of criminal liability in the 
range of thirty-five to fifty years imprisonment and approximately one 
million dollars in fines.
53
 Regardless of which estimate is more 
accurate, it is certain that Aaron Swartz was living with the possibility 
of losing, in a practical sense, the very principle that he had been 
fighting for so fervently: freedom. 
On January 11, 2013, two years to the day after his arrest on the 
indictment, Aaron committed suicide by hanging himself in his 
apartment.
54
 Following this event, his family stated it was not merely a 
personal tragedy but “the product of a criminal justice system rife with 
intimidation and prosecutorial [sic] overreach.”55 They further 
intimated that “[d]ecisions made by officials in the Massachusetts U.S. 
Attorney’s Office and at MIT contributed to his death.”56 Needless to 
                                                 
51
 Such proscribed activities include: obtaining information concerning national 
defense or foreign relations; the unauthorized/exceeds authorized access of 
information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or 
information from a US Department or Agency; the obtainment of information in 
furtherance of a fraud; transmission of a program or code to cause damage to 
computer systems; communications threatening damage to systems for the 
purposes of extortion. See 18 U.S.C. 1030 §(a_(1)-(7). 
52
 Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C). 
53
 Compare Senate Request for Brief from Attorney General Eric Holder (2013), 
available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/2013-01-
28-DEI-EEC-to-Holder-re-Aaron-Schwartz-prosecution.pdf (indicating 50 years 
imprisonment and $1 million in fines), with US ATT’Y’S OFFICE DISTRICT OF 
MASS Press Release, supra note 48, (indicating 35 years imprisonment and $1 
million in fines). 
 
54
 See Joe Kemp et al., Aaron Swartz, co-founder of Reddit and online activist, 
hangs himself in Brooklyn apartment, NY DAILY NEWS (Jan. 12, 2013), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/co-founder-reddit-hangs-brooklyn-
apartment-article-1.1238852 (discussing the timing of Aaron’s death). 
55
 See id. 
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say, Aaron’s legacy has continued to have an impact in the world of 
open-access activism.
57
 
D. Introducing Aaron’s Law: An Attempt to Limit the Broad 
Language of the CFAA 
In January 2013, in the wake of Aaron’s suicide, United States 
Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA 19
th
 District) posted drafts of a bill 
she dubbed “Aaron’s Law” to solicit public feedback.58 In June 2013, 
Lofgren submitted a final version of the proposed amendment H.R. 
2454.
59
 Lofgren cites Aaron’s victimization by overzealous 
prosecution under the CFAA as the inspiration for its overhaul.
60
 The 
Congresswoman further indicated that the law must distinguish 
between everyday internet activity and criminal activity designed to 
cause serious damage to public or private business.
61
 In her proposed 
law, Congresswoman Lofgren aimed to establish that the mere breach 
of terms of service, employment agreements, or contracts would not be 
considered to be violations of the CFAA.
62
 
Aaron’s Law radically changes the CFAA, as it removes the phrase 
“exceeds authorized access” and replaces it with “access without 
authorization.”63 Aaron’s Law then goes on to define the phrase 
“without authorization” as “knowingly circumvent[ing] one or more 
technological or physical measures that are designed to exclude or 
prevent unauthorized individuals” from accessing particular 
information.
64
 This law, in turn, significantly narrows the scope of 
conduct that qualifies as hacking. One of its effects would be to limit a 
prosecutor’s ability to charge a computer user under the CFAA with 
severe penalties for minor infractions.
65
 
                                                                                                                   
56
 See id. 
57
 This note itself exists as a result of Aaron’s legacy. 
58
 Zoe Lofgren & Ron Wyden, Introducing Aaron’s Law, a Desperately Needed 
Reform of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, (Jun. 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/06/aarons-law-is-finally-here/. 
59
 Zoe Lofgren, Rep Zoe Lofgren Introduces Bipartisan Aaron’s Law, U.S. HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES PRESS RELEASES (Jun. 20, 2013), http://lofgren.house.gov
/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=365647. 
60
 See id. 
61
 See id. 
62
 See id. 
63
 Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R. 2454, 113th Cong. (2013). 
64
 Id. 
65
 See id. 
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It is unclear whether Aaron’s law would have prevented the 
injustice Aaron suffered had its provisions been in effect when he 
downloaded and disseminated the JSTOR documents. Put another 
way, could Aaron have been charged with violating of the CFAA if the 
amendment proposed in his name had been in effect when he 
downloaded the JSTOR documents? In order to analyze the question, 
however, we must also ask: were Aaron’s actions “everyday internet 
activity” of the type that Congresswoman Lofgren cites in her goals 
for the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act? If Aaron’s actions were not 
“everyday internet activity,” then where should the line be drawn? 
III. THE CFAA CIRCUIT SPLIT: CASE LAW INTERPRETING 
“EXCEEDS AUTHORIZED ACCESS” 
There is currently a circuit split as to whether the term “exceeds 
authorized access,” as defined in the CFAA, should be interpreted 
broadly or narrowly.
66
 This section will explore the majority of Circuit 
Courts of Appeal which have ruled on the issue and have interpreted 
the meaning of the phrase broadly.
67
 
A. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc. 
The First Circuit, in the case of EF Cultural Travel BV v. 
Explorica, Inc., found that an employee who was in breach of a broad 
confidentiality agreement prohibiting certain use of company 
information was exceeding authorized access.
68
 In EF Cultural, an 
employer sued former employees under the CFAA based on 
allegations that the former employees, who now worked for EF’s 
competitor, Explorica, used their knowledge of EF’s system to design 
a program that would gather information about EF’s pricing for the 
purpose of undercutting its business.
69
 The former employees 
previously had access to that kind of information.
70
 The court ruled 
                                                 
66
 See generally Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Exceeding 
Authorized Access in the Workplace: Prosecuting Disloyal Conduct Under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 281, 285 (2013). 
67
 See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001), 
United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
John, 597 F.3d 854 (5th Cir. 2010); and Int’l Airport Ctrs. LLC v. Citrin, 440 
F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). 
68
 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc. 274 F.3d 577 (1
st
 Cir. 2001). 
69
 See id. 
70
 See id. 
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that the former employees’ access under the circumstances of the 
confidentiality agreement, however, exceeded their authorized 
access.
71
 
B. International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin 
The Honorable Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, 
expounded on the approach found in EF Culture in finding that an 
employee was without authorization once he violated a duty of loyalty 
to his employer.
72
 In Int’l Airport, an outgoing employee deleted files 
from a company laptop and loaded a secure erasure program onto the 
computer that prevented recovery of the system’s memory.73 Even 
though the defendant’s employment agreement allowed him to “return 
or destroy” data on the laptop, the court found that his authorization 
terminated when his conduct went against the interests of his 
employer, and furthermore violated the duty of loyalty that he owed to 
his employer.
74
 
C. United States v. Rodriquez 
In U.S. v. Rodriguez, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
found that the defendant had exceeded his authorization of computer 
access when he accessed personal information in his employer’s 
database for non-business reasons.
75
 The defendant argued that 
because he accessed only databases and because he was authorized to 
use the database as an employee, he had not exceeded his authorized 
access.
76
 The court emphasized that the defendant’s access had 
violated his employer’s policy.77 
D. United States. v. John 
In United States v. John, the Fifth Circuit held that authorization, 
for purposes of the CFAA, “may encompass limits placed on the use 
of information obtained by permitted access to a computer system and 
                                                 
71
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data available on that system.”78 The defendant was charged with 
violating § 1030(a)(2) based on her misappropriation of customer 
information to commit fraud.
79
 The defendant contended that the 
statute does not prohibit unlawful use of information that was obtained 
through authorized access.
80
 In its ruling, the court focused on the fact 
that the defendant was aware of company policies against such use and 
acted in violation of those.
81
 
IV. THE FOLLY IN AARON’S LAW 
Aaron’s law, though motivated by good intentions, imposes too 
great a cost on plaintiffs in the civil arena. The narrowing effect that 
Aaron’s law would have on the CFAA’s justifiably broad language 
could remove the possibility of a cause of action under the CFAA for 
plaintiffs who have been the victims of serious hacking. 
A. Robbins v. Lower Merion School District: Removing a 
Remedy at Law 
The current language of the CFAA provides for a civil cause of 
action under its provisions.
82
 Aaron’s law would narrow the scope of 
activity that is actionable under the CFAA’s provisions and, 
consequently, remove a potential cause of action that currently exists 
for the benefit of individuals who have been a victim of hacking. One 
particularly illustrative case is Robbins v. Lower Merion School 
District.
83
 Robbins is noteworthy not only because of its unsettling 
facts, but because it is an instance where the CFAA was used as a 
cause of action by users against their administrator.
84
 All of the cases 
surveyed in Part III of this Note arise from an administrator or the 
government bringing an action against a user.
85
 The change in 
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dynamic brings up a fundamental point that is missed by the 
proponents of Aaron’s Law: the CFAA is, and should be used as, a 
tool for justice and not, as was Aaron’s experience, a disproportionate 
response to questionably illegal hacktivism. 
Robbins was a class action suit brought against a school district for 
allegedly spying on minor children in their homes via laptop 
webcams.
86
 The laptops were issued to students of Lower Merion 
School District as part of the District’s “one-to-one” laptop program 
which is described by the District itself as “one of the first in the 
nation.”87 All ninth grade students within the School District were 
issued laptops that they were allowed to keep for the duration of their 
high school career.
88
 The Lower Merion School District’s practice was 
to load a program called LANrev on all laptops in order to remotely 
manage and track misplaced and stolen one-to-one laptops.
89
 In case of 
loss or theft, LANrev allowed school officials to turn on the lost or 
stolen laptop’s webcam to snap photos and take screenshots of the 
laptop’s surroundings.90 According to the complaint, the School 
District made no reference to the fact that it could remotely activate 
the webcams without notice.
91
 In fact, the LANrev software apparently 
disabled the cameras for users, leading the students to believe that the 
camera was just for show.
92
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The School District’s procedures for activating the tracking 
software were at best unorganized, and at worst abused or neglected. 
Approximately ten school officials had authorization to activate the 
tracking.
93
 There were a handful of cases in which a laptop was 
recovered but the webcam tracking remained active for weeks after, 
snapping photos of unsuspecting minor students.
94
 An investigator for 
the School District indicated that, in approximately one dozen cases, it 
wasn’t apparent why the webcam was activated at all.95 Students 
reported the webcam’s green light turn on, signaling that the webcam 
had been activated, but they dismissed the phenomenon as a glitch.
96
 
By the time the tracking was brought to light, approximately 56,000 
images had been captured by laptop webcams without students’ 
knowledge.
97
 
Lower Merion’s clandestine laptop tracking program had gone 
largely undetected until November of 2009. According to the 
complaint, it was on November 11, 2009, that the plaintiffs were, for 
the first time, informed of the capability and practice of the School 
District concerning LANrev webcam tracking.
98
 On that day, the 
plaintiff was approached by Harriton High School’s Assistant 
Principal Lindy Matsko. 
99
 Matsko informed the plaintiff that the 
School District believed he had engaged in improper behavior in his 
home.
100
 As proof of such behavior, Matsko cited as evidence a 
photograph that had been taken by the plaintiff’s School District issued 
laptop.
101
 Matsko further informed the plaintiff of the School District’s 
ability to remotely activate the webcam he had kept in his room at 
home.
102
 
Among other causes of action, the plaintiffs alleged that the School 
District had exceeded its authorized access in violation of the CFAA in 
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that it exceeded its authorized access to the plaintiff’s laptop.103 The 
plaintiffs requested, and were granted, an injunction prohibiting the 
activation of the tracking software.
104
 The implications of what the 
webcam images showed were enormous. The legal director for the 
Pennsylvania chapter for the American Civil Liberties Union 
commented that “[t]his is fodder for child porn.”105 
After litigation, the Lower Merion School District paid 
approximately $610,000 to settle Robbins and a companion suit arising 
out of similar circumstances.
106
 The judge ordered that the temporary 
injunction prohibiting the activation of laptop computers issued to its 
students would be superseded by a permanent injunction to the same 
effect.
107
 
Robbins illustrates how the CFAA can be used as a tool by 
plaintiffs who deserve a range of counts seeking recovery when 
someone has exceeded their authorized access to their computer. The 
plaintiffs in Robbins had their privacy interests violated by a complete 
abuse of a computer system by the school district. Without the current 
language of the CFAA, the plaintiffs would have had one less cause of 
action and one less reason for Lower Merion School District to settle. 
B. Statutory Interpretation Supports the CFAA’s Broad 
Language 
Maxims of statutory interpretation support a broad reading of the 
CFAA, rather than a narrow reading that Aaron’s Law calls for. Under 
the CFAA, “exceeds authorized access” means “to access a computer 
with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information 
in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”108 
A narrow interpretation of the phrase may be inconsistent with the last 
words of the definition as set forth by Congress in the statute itself: 
“obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not 
entitled so to obtain or alter.”109 “So” means “in the state or manner 
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indicated or expressed.”110 The inclusion of the word “so” in 
1030(e)(6) is unambiguous in that someone exceeds authorized access 
when he obtains information he is not entitled to obtain or alter under 
the circumstances. The word “so” also indicates that the accesser may 
have been entitled to obtain the same information for other purposes, 
but not for illegitimate purposes that contravene the purpose for which 
restricted access is required. 
For instance, suppose an employer grants an employee access to all 
information on its computer system, but restricts access authority by 
indicating that the employee only has permission to access medical 
records on the computer system during the workday, with the written 
approval of a supervisor. If these circumstances are not present, the 
employee is not authorized to access medical records and therefore has 
no right to access the medical records. If the employee accesses a 
medical record in contravention of his employer’s restrictions, he is 
not “entitled so to obtain” such information and has exceeded his 
authorized access. 
Thus, “exceeds authorized access” indicates that someone exceeds 
authorized access by obtaining information in a manner which is 
restricted even if the accesser is entitled to obtain the same information 
under non-restricted circumstances. There is nothing in §1030 that 
purports to allay employer-employee use-based restriction agreements. 
Thus, an employee exceeds authorized access if he acts in 
contravention of his employer’s use-based access restriction by 
obtaining information for a prohibited reason.
111
 
A somewhat unique aspect of the CFAA as a statute is that, besides 
criminal penalties, it also provides a civil remedy based upon the same 
“without or exceeding authorized access” standard that is applicable to 
the criminal penalties.
112
 This dual nature makes for a delicate balance 
when policy and emotion meet, as happened in Aaron’s case. 
                                                 
110
  “So,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/so (last visited Sep. 20, 2014). 
111
 See United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5
th
 Cir. 2010) (“Access to a 
computer and data that can be obtained from that access may be exceeded if the 
purposes for which access has been given are exceeded.”); Cont’l Group, Inc. v. 
KW Prop. Mgmt, LLC, 662 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1372 (S.D. Fla 2009) (finding a 
“substantial likelihood” that defendant exceeded authorization when she 
downloaded files for her own purposes, where her employer’s computer access 
policies stated that its computers “are provided for business use” and any 
equipment is provided “to be used solely for [the employer’s] purposes”). 
112
 Id. 
232 UMass Law Review v. 10 | 214 
Because the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is a statute with both 
civil and criminal implications, any discussion of possible ambiguities 
should touch upon, at least briefly, the possible applicability of the 
Rule of Lenity to the statute’s analysis. Generally, when a term in a 
criminal statute is ambiguous, that term should be construed narrowly 
in favor of the defendant.
113
 However, the “simple existence of some 
statutory ambiguity is not sufficient to warrant application of the rule 
of lenity, for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree.”114 Further, 
a criminal statute is not improper simply because it might apply to a 
broad range of conduct.
115
 Thus, reliance on the Rule of Lenity to 
force a narrow interpretation of the term “exceeds authorized access” 
is tenuous. 
C. Aaron’s Law Would Reverse Decades of Legislative Intent 
The current statutory definition of “exceeds authorized access” was 
enacted in 1986.
116
 The reason for enacting this phrase was to 
substitute: 
for the more cumbersome phrase in present 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1) 
and (a)(2), “or having accessed a computer with authorization, uses 
the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such 
authorization does not extend”. The Committee intends this change 
to simplify the language in 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1) and (2), and the 
phrase “exceeds authorized access” is defined separately in Section 
(2)(g) of the bill.
117
 
 
Clearly, the phrase replaced a “more cumbersome” one that 
specifically spoke to access in violation of use-based restrictions. 
 The legislative history of §1030 noted and accepted that the 
CFAA, as amended, “specifically covers the conduct of a person 
who deliberately breaks into a computer without authority, or an 
insider who exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains 
classified information and then communicates that information to 
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another person, or retains it without delivering it to the proper 
authorities.
118
  
Further, as amended in 1996, the statute intended to close “gaps in 
the law to protect better the confidentiality, integrity, and security of 
data and networks.”119 Thus, the legislative history shows that 
Congress intended the term to have a broad meaning and applicability. 
Further, the legislative intent of the word “loss” must be examined, 
as for purposes of the CFAA it indicates a broad meaning and 
application. The CFAA defines “loss” as 
any reasonable cost to any victim, including (1) the cost of 
responding to an offense, (2) conducting a damage assessment, and 
(3) restoring the data, program, system or information to its 
condition prior to the offense, and (4) any revenue lost, cost 
incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of 
interruption of service.
120
 
The legislative history of the 1996 amendments to the CFAA 
contemplates that “although there is arguably no ‘damage,’ 
nevertheless, the victim suffers ‘loss.’”121 Further, it has been noted 
that “Congress intended the term ‘loss’ to target remedial expenses 
borne by a victim that could not properly be considered direct damage 
caused by a hacker.”122 Such broad language leaves significant 
discretion to the plaintiff in a civil case or the prosecutor in a criminal 
case. 
D. Lessig’s Take: Aaron Swartz Did Not Violate the CFAA as 
Written 
In order to gain a better understanding of the possible implications 
of Aaron’s Law on the MIT/JSTOR incident, it will be helpful to 
understand Aaron’s actions in light of the theories of Lawrence 
Lessig.
123
 Lessig is an advocate of political beliefs, including such as 
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 Lawrence Lessig is the Roy L. Furman Professor of Law and Leadership at 
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the need for a second Constitutional Convention.
124
 Lessig met Aaron 
when Aaron was in his early teens.
125
 However, Lessig describes 
Aaron, who was much younger than him, as his mentor.
126
 
Lessig defines “hacking” as “the use of technical knowledge to 
advance a public good.”127 He acknowledges that Aaron was a hacker 
while distinguishing the title from a “cracker” or one whose intent is 
not to advance public good.
128
 He and Aaron saw the impediments set 
in the way of open-access to information as a kind of social 
corruption.
129
 With his view that social corruption is hampering open-
access to information, Lessig took a sympathetic approach to Aaron’s 
actions in the MIT/JSTOR incident. 
According to Lessig, Aaron’s actions could not have amounted to 
unauthorized access in violation of the CFAA because there was no 
traditional “hacking” involved in the MIT/JSTOR incident.130 In 
support of this assertion, he explains that Aaron noticed that the URL 
on JSTOR’s website ends with a number that references a specific 
article.
131
 When Aaron recognized the pattern, he realized that it would 
be simple to write a “script”132 to download all of the articles.133 Aaron 
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simply had to write a script that would generate numbers that fall 
within the range that JSTOR assigns its articles.
134
 Aaron was able to 
download such a massive volume of documents via this method.
135
 
Lessig explains that when JSTOR noticed the volume of data being 
downloaded from Aaron’s single IP address,136 they blocked him.137 
Without missing a step, Aaron took a new IP address. 
138
 JSTOR 
became aware of the volume being downloaded on the new IP address, 
so they blocked a range of IP addresses.
139
 Blocking a range of IP 
addresses rendered JSTOR practically useless on the MIT campus.
140
 
JSTOR then determined the MAC address of Aaron’s computer.141 A 
MAC address is a unique identification number tied directly to a 
specific computer.
142
 Aaron then found a way to “spoof” a new MAC 
address.
143
 
Instead of “hacking,” Lessig describes these actions as “technical 
tricks” to enable the download of many articles.144 Presumably, Lessig 
would even stretch so far as to categorize Aaron’s actions as 
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Congresswoman Lofgren sees them: everyday internet activity.
145
 
However, even Lessig must admit that, while Aaron was permitted to 
download some JSTOR articles by way of the fact that he was a 
Harvard fellow, he was not permitted to take all of the articles as it 
was almost certainly his intention.
146
 
In exploring Aaron’s motivations for his actions, Lessig points to a 
conference that Aaron attended where JSTOR indicated that the cost of 
making its database available to the public would be $250,000,000.
147
 
He then contends that this conference is where Aaron began preparing 
for the MIT/JSTOR incident.
148
 
E. Other Proposed Reform: The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation 
Lessig views Aaron’s Law as an incomplete reform.149 He points 
to the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), which proposes three 
goals for reform of the CFAA.
150
 The EFF is a self-proclaimed 
champion of the public interest “in every critical battle affecting digital 
rights.”151 According to its website, the EFF is made up of lawyers, 
political analysts, activists, and technologists, which consequently 
places it at the forefront of open-access issues.
152
 Thus, it has devised 
the following three goals for reform of the CFAA. 
First, there should be no criminal exposure for violating private 
agreements or duties.
153
 The EFF acknowledges that Aaron’s Law, as 
proposed by Lofgren, focuses exclusively on this issue.
154
 The EFF 
claims that it is dangerous for private contracts to be enforceable via 
punishment of severe criminal penalties subject to vast prosecutorial 
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discretion.
155
 Eviscerating the CFAA by enacting Aaron’s Law, 
however, could have unintended consequences, by removing a cause 
of action from those seeking justice. The EFF does, however, indicate 
that users may face civil or criminal liability under its first proposed 
goal for more egregious violations, such as destroying data.
156
 This 
goal quickly begins to smack of the same prosecutorial discretion 
permitted by the CFAA in its current form. Thus, it seems a rather 
bland reform. 
Second, the EFF proposes that, if one is allowed to access 
information, “doing it in an innovative way shouldn’t be a crime.”157 It 
claims that, as it is written today, the CFAA exposes users to criminal 
liability if they engage in “commonplace ‘circumvention’ techniques 
like changing IP addresses, MAC addresses, or browser User Agent 
headers.”158 Certainly, as commonplace as the EFF would like to think 
those advanced circumvention techniques are, it would be hard pressed 
to show that the average user possesses such technical knowledge or 
that he even knows it is possible. This hole in the reasoning behind the 
second goal is difficult to swallow. 
The EFF further contends that “technological barriers increasingly 
serve purposes far removed from preventing computer intrusion.”159 
Even the most arbitrary of technological barriers, however, at its very 
least, serves to prevent intrusion’s unfortunate cousin: misuse. 
The third and final goal that the EFF would like to see 
accomplished in reforming the CFAA is to make penalties more 
proportionate to offenses.
160
 It contends, correctly, that several 
sections of the CFAA are redundant and vulnerable to prosecutors who 
seek to pursue multiple offenses based on the same behavior.
161
 It is 
with this proposal that the EFF makes its most reasonable and well-
thought out point. Limiting the opportunity for prosecutors to “double 
dip” by pursuing multiple offenses based on one act would have 
substantially decreased the criminal exposure and possible prison time 
Aaron was facing as a result of the MIT/JSTOR incident.
162
 Further, 
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limiting the high proportion of punitive measures imputed to each 
violation would have substantially limited the total amount of prison 
time Aaron was facing. Regardless, just because sentencing for a first 
offense is stiff does not make it any less legal, so long as it complies 
with constitutional requirements, which the CFAA undoubtedly does. 
There are other circumstances, however, that shine a different light on 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When assessing future reform of the CFAA, it is important to take 
heed of and contemplate the distinction between situations like the 
MIT/JSTOR incident and what happened in Robbins. In Aaron’s case, 
the CFAA was abused by means of prosecutorial indiscretion; 
smothering him with the stress of a potentially long prison sentence 
and vast financial penalties. Aaron was accused of violating the CFAA 
by trying to sidestep a network administrator in order to spread access 
to knowledge. In Robbins, the CFAA was used as a cause of action by 
computer users against an administrator who took liberties with 
computer privacy. The soundest approach to the broad language of the 
CFAA is not its evisceration, which would have prevented the 
plaintiffs in Robbins from alleging a count under the CFAA. The 
soundest approach, what justice calls for as it does in the 
implementation of all laws, is sound discretion. In essence, we don’t 
need to amend the CFAA by way of reactionary, knee-jerk legislation 
motivated and driven by prosecutorial indiscretion. The history, both 
legislative and common law, behind the CFAA’s broad language 
demonstrates sound policy objectives, as is easily illustrated by 
Robbins. No, what we need isn’t a change in the law, “we need 
prosecutors who know the difference between Aaron and evil.”163 
 
                                                 
163
 Lessig on Aaron’s Laws, supra, note 125. 
